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Our paper explores the economic conditions that lead third parties to intervene in
ongoinginternalwars. Wedevelopaformalmodelthattiestogethersomeofthemain
forces driving the decision to interfere in a civil war, including the economic beneﬁts
accruing from the intervention and the potential costs associated with such choice.
We predict that third party interventions are most likely in civil conﬂicts where the
country at war harbors a proﬁtable industry as a consequence of its high levels of
peace-time production and state strength, while the opposition forces’ strength re-
duces the likelihood of intervention. We also present novel empirical results on the
role of valuable goods, i.e. oil, in prompting third party military intervention in con-
texts of high state stability, by using a dataset on intrastate conﬂicts on the period
1960-1999.
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1 Introduction
Since 1945 an estimated 13 to 26 million civilians have lost their lives in the course of armed
conﬂicts, most of them in civil wars (Valentino et al. , 2004). This type of conﬂict is the prevailing
form of war, making up more than 90% of contemporary armed conﬂicts, and are more frequent
in poor countries. Despite a traditional emphasis on the internal causes and consequences of
civil wars (see Blattman & Miguel, 2010), the role played by the international dimensions of such
conﬂictsandthepotentialfortransationalspreadofcivilwariswellestablishedintheliteratureon
conﬂict (Gleditsch,2007a,b). Civilwarmay spreadviolence outsidetheboundaries ofthecountry
where the conﬂict occurs(e.g. Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006) and prompt military intervention by
third party states, or by the international community under the rubric of peacekeeping operations
(Diehl, 2008).
The existing research on the role of third parties in civil wars focuses mainly on the eﬀect of
intervention on civil war outcomes and its duration, to identify the extent to which interventions
by states or coalitions of states decrease violence (e.g. Regan, 1996, 2002; Doyle & Sambanis,
2006). Part of the literature shows that military instruments are ineﬀective and sometimes have
a negative eﬀect on the economic recovery of war-torn societies (see Diehl, 2008, for a review
of the literature). In particular, simultaneous interventions on the government and opposition
sides prolong civil conﬂicts (Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 2000), a ﬁnding corroborated by Regan
(2002) and Elbadawi & Sambanis (2000). Moreover, (U.S.) military interventions may also have
a counterproductive impact on the number of terrorist attacks originating from the host-countries
when these countries are oil-exporting (Azam & Thelen, 2010). This is not surprising given a
lack of understanding of the motivations and constraints faced by intervening nations, and their
implications on the conﬂict outcome. External parties may have incentives in undermining a
peace settlement, and vested interests in the conﬂict outcome that could exacerbate the level
of violence among conﬂict antagonists and possibly justify their own involvment. Therefore,
before trying to explain the impact of those operations, we ﬁrst need to understand the reasons
for intervening.
Our paper explores the economic conditions that lead third parties to intervene in ongoing
internal wars. We start by developing a formal model that ties together the main economic forcesEconomic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 3
driving the decision to interfere in a civil war and the potential costs associated with such choice.
The role of third-party intervention in conﬂicts has recently received some attention from theoret-
ical economists, but there is still no consensus on how one should analytically characterize third
party military intervention as an activity and how one should integrate a third party into traditional
two party models of conﬂict (Bove & Smith, 2011). Siqueira (2003) takes the third-party’s ally as
given and examines the impact on the conﬂict intensity of siding with or against the government,
depending on the relative strength of the actors. However, he does not model the intervener’s
decision. An earlier attempt to study the endogeneity of third-party intervention in conﬂict was
made by Chang et al. (2007) and Amegashie & Kutsoati (2007). Chang et al. (2007) consider
the interaction between a third party’s intervention technology and the conﬂict technologies of
the belligerents and show how this interaction aﬀects the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium out-
come. According to their model, a third party can secure peace or disrupt an existing peaceful
order, depending on the nature of the conﬂict and its objectives. Amegashie & Kutsoati (2007)
endogenize a third-party’s choice of whom to side with and distinguish between military and
non-military options. They show how the third party’s decision to intervene depends on conﬂict
factors such as the shape of the conﬂict success function, the relative capacities of the combatants,
the duration of the conﬂict in the absence of intervention and the weight attributed to the welfare
of the combatants. The main focus of these papers is the impact of the intervention on the conﬂict
outcome given some kind of altruism on the part of the intervener towards either the populations
directly aﬀected by conﬂict, or the combatants. None of these works goes beyond the canonical
characterization of conﬂict and intervention as a struggle for victory on the battleground, thus
incorporating only military features (e.g. the ﬁghting eﬀort and the success ratio) and ignoring
a number of non-military elements which are likely to be central to the decision to intervene.
Recent theoretical developments emphasize the role of institutions, economic development and
natural resources in shaping civil conﬂict (Besley & Persson, 2010a,b). Accordingly, violence
is associated with institutional and economic factors, such as the capacity of a state to fulﬁll its
functions or economic shocks that can aﬀect wages and aid. Chang et al. (2007) and Chang &
Sanders (2009) do consider the economic motivations of third-parties deciding to militarily inter-
vene, yet the beneﬁts of intervention are exogenous. Our formalization takes into account conﬂict
characteristics but broadens the scope and helps to clarify the role of a number of endogenousEconomic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 4
economic factors which can explain why some conﬂicts attract interventions while others do not.
However, we still account for some military factors hampering the decision to intervene.
We test our theoretical framework empirically against a dataset on intrastate conﬂicts on the
period 1960-1999. To date, only one study by Regan (1998) explains empirically the causes of
third party involvement in civil wars, and ﬁnds that intense conﬂicts are unlikely to attract outside
actors, while those that involve humanitarian crises are likely to do so. Some studies exam-
ine which conﬂicts attract UN intervention (Gilligan et al. , 2003; Mullenbach, 2005; Doyle &
Sambanis, 2000), while others explain the issue of troop contribution to peacekeeping operations
(Lebovic, 2004; Bove & Elia, 2011). However, these works mostly focus on security interests
(i.e. proximity), humanitarian concerns (i.e. casualties, refugees) and ethnic and colonial ties,
thus disregarding a number of economic factors which have been proved to statistically aﬀect the
likelihood and durability of civil wars (e.g. Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier et al. , 2004; Fearon,
2005; Besley & Persson, 2008; Bruckner & Ciccone, 2010) and may well explain the incen-
tives to intervene in an internal war. Economic ties between countries have for instance been
shown to play a deterministic role in protecting the trading partner in an interstate dispute (Aydin,
2008). Yet, there are no systematic studies on the economic value of an interstate dispute and the
mechanism through which economic factors encourage third-party states to intervene. Military
intervention is a ﬁnancially expensive, risky, and dangerous endeavor. Therefore, the states must
balance the expected costs with their strategic interests, but also with possible economic beneﬁts
accruing form the intervention and the opportunities for success.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents a model of a conﬂict with the possibility of third
party intervention. Section 3 describes our dataset and discusses the methodological issues in-
volved in the choice of the proxies, section 4 presents the methods used in the empirical analysis.
Section 5 provides empirical support to our theoretical hypotheses and Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 Theoretical Framework
We consider a country i harbouring an industry producing (or extracting) a valuable good (oil, nat-
ural gaz, diamonds...). The industry’s net proﬁts in time t are given by λtπt, where the weightingEconomic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 5
factor λt represents the strength and stability of country s at time t. We assume that λt = λ > 0 if
country i is in a peaceful situation, while λt = 0 otherwise. In the presence of weak institutions,
proﬁts may be diluted in attempting to enforce contracts even in peaceful times (i.e. λ < 1). When
the country is highly unstable, and prone to regime changes, foreign investments in the country
are at risk of disruption or even expropriation, thus lowering the proﬁtability of the industries in
country s. λ can be interpreted as a "‘business enhancing” form of state capacity, which shows
how in particular cases of extremely fragile states, multinational corporations may not ﬁnd the
investment proﬁtable, even in presence of large reserves of natural resources. This important
speciﬁcation allows us to distinguish between countries which are potentially at war where the
investments are viable, from otherwise similar countries where the unpredictability of the regime
duration makes the investments inadvisable. For the purpose of our analysis, we use the notions
of state strength and state stability interchangeably.
Country i faces internal opposition by a sub-group of the population. To keep things simple
we assume that the citizens of country κ form two equally sized groups, each represented by a
leader aiming to maximize his group’s well being. One of these leaders is in power and is named
the incumbent and accordingly denoted by I, while the other leader represents the opposition and
is designated by O. The game takes place over two time periods, t = {1,2}. In the beginning
of time period 1, country s is embroiled in a civil war which criples the manufacturing industry
and yields a victor who controls the government for the remaining of period 1. The incumbent
(winner) imposes on the losing side its policy for the current period, and therefore decides the
taxes and transfers in the country given the taxing constraint τit ≤ T (i = {I,O}). Therefore,
in t = 1 the incumbent government taxes labour-income by imposing unit taxes of τi1 ≤ T on
group i’s individuals. Given its budget constraint, the incumbent government invests resources in
constituting an army of size a which will be operational starting from the next time period. In a
second stage of the same time period the opposition collects contributions (taxes) among its own
group, ˜ τO1, and decides the size of the rebel army, r, to gather to try overruling the incumbent in
the subsequent time period. In the second time period, the opposition decides whether or not to
try taking over the government by violent means, and if it does, its likelihood of success is given




where e ≤ 1 (1)
The e parameter designates the contestants’ relative ﬁghting eﬃciency. Subsequently, the
incumbent and the opposition take the same decisions as in t = 1.
Absence of third party intervention
Solving the game backwardly, it is immediate to deduce that τO2 = T, and therefore that
−τI2 = T + 2λ2π
w , which means that the opposition group pays the highest admissible tax, and the
incumbent group receives these proceeds and the country’s proﬁts under the form of transfers.
In the ﬁrst time period, when the opposition group decides to arm in order to attempt taking





1 − ˜ τO1 
w + p(a,r)uO2 + (1 − p(a,r))uI2 (2)
s.t.

      
      
r ≤ ˜ τO1w/2
˜ τO1 ≤ 1 − τO1
Where uI2 depicts the utility of the incumbent in the second time period given that the indus-
try is generating no proﬁts because of conﬂict. The ﬁrst constraint captures the trade-oﬀ between
weapons production and citizen’s consumption, while the second constraint forebids the oppo-
sition leader to tax his supporters more than their net income (i.e. after the central government
collected taxes).
At optimality if the constraint is not binding, the F.O.C. reads:
−pr
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= 2 (3)Economic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 7











Notice, however, that this move is proﬁtable to the opposition party only if the expected payoﬀ
is larger than when not arming and passively accepting being in the opposition in t = 2. If we
denote by ad the threshold level of a above which O is better oﬀ not purchasing weapons, ad
should satisfy the following inequality:




uI2 − r(ad) (5)




uI2 − uO2 
≤ r(ad) (6)
or, replacing for the appropriate values:
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expression (7) as follows:
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We therefore have that ∂Ψ









which in turn allows us to conclude that the opposition group is undeterred for any a such that
r(a) > 0. Hence, ad = a|r(a)=0, or ad = e
2
 
uI2 − uO2 
.
For the deterrence strategy to be implementable, however, the incumbent government should
dispose of the necessary resources to fund these expenditures. The question is particularly salient
when considering a country already embroiled in civil strife, whose industry is crippled by the
conﬂict. The feasibility constraint thus reads as:








Should the above condition be violated, the Opposition movement will be undeterrable by the in-
cumbent government. Yet, if the condition is satisﬁed, for deterrence to be played at equilibrium,
we still ought to verify whether the incumbent government ﬁnds it optimal to play this strategy.
In order to determine the equilibrium strategy of the incumbent, we therefore need to compute
his payoﬀs under conﬂict and under deterrence.
The optimal size of the army of the incumbent if a violent conﬂict is to be expected is deter-




1 − τI1 
w + p(a,r)uI2 + (1 − p(a,r))uO2 (10)
s.t.

      
      
a ≤
 
j=I,O τj1w/2 + λπ
τO1 ≤ T
At optimality the constraint is binding and therefore determines the equilibrium transfers to
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And we thus derive the optimal armaments level:
a∗ =
 
uI2 − uO2 
8e
(11)
Plugging this value into r(a), we obtain:

      







if e ≥ 1/2
= 1 otherwise
(12)





This equilibrium probability of the government winning the conﬂict is such that i) when the
opposition is as eﬃcient as the government p∗ equals 1/2, ii) this probability is decreasing in e,
and iii) p∗ = 1 if e < 1/2.
Having computed the equilibrium size of the army in case of armed confrontation, we still
need to determine whether the deterrent option is more proﬁtable to the incumbent. A ﬁrst impor-
tant observation is that ad > a∗. Indeed, we have that ad = e
2
 
uI2 − uO2 
>
 
uI2 − uO2 
/(8e) = a∗
for any e ≥ 1/2.Economic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 10
For what follows we use the short notation uJt(a) (and τJt(a)) to designate the utility (and the
tax rate) of group J in time t given that the incumbent invests in an army of size a. Moreover,
we use the hat symbol to label the incumbent’s utility under peace. The deterrent strategy proves
more proﬁtable to the incumbent government if the following expression is satisﬁed:
uI1(ad) + ˆ uI2(0)) ≥ uI1(a∗) + p∗uI2(0) + (1 − p∗)uO2
⇔ −τI1(ad) − ˆ τI2(0) > −τI1(a∗) − T − p∗  
τI2(0) − T
 
Since −τItw = 2
 
λt
jπt − at 
+ Tw, and given that in case of deterrence λ2 = λ, the above
expression can be re-written as:
2T − 2ad/w > T + 2λπ/w − 2a∗/w − T + 2p∗T
⇔ (1 − p∗)Tw + λπ > ad − a∗
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Condition (14) allows us to state the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Provided the incumbent government is able to fund a deterrent army, deterrence
is more likely to be observed for higher levels of peace-time proﬁts λπ (i.e. state stability and
production), for lower state tax capacity T, for lower wages w and for lower relative ﬁghting
eﬃciency levels of the opposition, e.Economic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 11
The intuition behind these ﬁndings is straightforward. Notice that the opposition forces will
not be able to enjoy the proﬁts λπ if they attempt to overrule the incumbent government by force,
since the civil war will freeze the activity of the industry. On the other hand, higher peace-
time proﬁts incentivize the incumbent to make sure the country remains stable. Both lower state
capacity and lower wages increase the incentives for deterring the opposition forces. Indeed, the
incentives for the opposition to take over power are reduced since the pie at stake is smaller.
This, in turn implies that the level of deterrent weapons will also be lower at equilibrium, since
the opposition will invest less eﬀort in attempting to ﬁght the government forces. Hence, the
cost of deterrence being smaller, the incumbent is more likely to deter the opposition forces.
Certainly, since the pie at stake is smaller for the opposition forces, the same holds true for the
incumbent, whose incentives to ﬁght to stay in power are lower. Yet, this eﬀect aﬀects the conﬂict
and deterrent payoﬀs of the incumbent in the same fashion (i.e. proportionally), thus not further
aﬀecting the deterrence incentives. Lastly, weaker opposition forces are less eﬃcient in a civil
war, which implies a higher probability of victory for the incumbent in case of conﬂict, but they
also make the opponent deterable at a lower cost. In the relevant range of parameters (e ≥ 1/2)
the latter eﬀect always dominates the former.
Third party intervention
We now introduce the possibility of a third party intervention in country i by an external ac-
tor. Assume there exists a country that has the possibility to deploy troops abroad. The military
technology of the third party intervener (TPI) is taken not to be necessarily the same as the in-
cumbent’s technology so that the opposition’s relative ﬁghting eﬃciency against the the TPI is
given by ˜ e ∈ [1/2;∞[.
We denote by b the total size of intervention. The beneﬁts of an intervention take the form of
privilieged contracts and other business agreements between the TPI and the incumbent govern-
ment. Moreover, we assume that the TPI is never budget constrained.
In case a third party intervention does occur in country i, the cost of the operation to the TPI
is therefore equal to b = ad. The price the incumbent government is willing to pay for having
a peaceful society therefore constitutes a crucial determinant of third party intervention. This
amount is equal to the payoﬀ diﬀerence for the incumbent between prolonging the civil conﬂictEconomic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 12
and putting an end to it. Combining these expressions, we obtain that the following condition for
observing a third party intervention:
b = ad < uI1(0) + ˆ uI2(ad) −
 
uI1(a∗) + p∗uI2(a∗) + (1 − p∗)uO2 










This condition, combined with Condition (9) allows us to state the following proposition that
contains the testable hypothesis of our model:
Proposition 2. Third party intervention in civil wars is more likely to be observed for higher
levels of peace-time proﬁts λπ (i.e. the combination of state stability and production), for lower
state tax capacity T, and for lower wages w. Moreover, assuming that the relative strength of
the opposition against the TPI (˜ e) is less reactive to a change in power of the opposition than the
relative strength of the incumbent (e), the stronger the opposition, the more likely we witness a
third party intervention.
The comparative statics results are straightforward. Yet the following graphical representation
may help clarify the ideas.
On the x-axis of Figure 1 we measure the peace-time proﬁtability of country i’s industry,
while the relative strength of the opposition forces with respect to the incumbent are depicted on
the y-axis. The solid horizontal line represents the feasibility constraint, therefore implying that
the incumbent has the means to deter the opposition on the South of this line alone: a stronger
opposition increases the amount of resources required for the opposition to be deterred. The
incresaing dotted curve is the locus of points satisfying condition 14 with equality. In the area
lying on the North-West quadrant of this curve the incumbent government is unwilling to deter the
opposition forces, and prefers to ﬁght instead. Finally, the decreasing dashed curve is the locus
of points satisfying condition 15 with equality. We therefore have that in the triangle-shaped area
lying between the dotted, the dashed, and the solid curves, the TPI is willing to restore peace atEconomic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 13
Figure 1: Third party intervention in Civil Wars for ˜ e < e
terms that are satisfying to the incumbent opposition, while the incumbent would be able to deter
the opposition forces if it desired so. In the area lying above the horizontal line, and to the right of
the dashed one, the third party intervener is willing to restore peace, and the incumbent is unable
to deter the opposition even if it were willing to.
Consider a value of e such that the incumbent government has the means to deter the oppo-
sition forces if it chooses so. For low values of peace-time proﬁts, λπ, neither the government,
nor the TPI would be willing to end the on-going conﬂict. Indeed, in resource-poor countries,
the beneﬁts from securing a peaceful environment do not justify the disproportionately important
means required to achieve that outcome. In the presence of a more proﬁtable industry (higher
λπ), however, the relatively ﬁtter TPI (˜ e < e) will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to intervene militarily in the
civil conﬂict, when the incumbent government would have otherwise prolonged the civil war. For
intermediate levels of peace-time proﬁts, the incumbent government is not suﬃciently eﬃcient on
the battle ground to implement a deterrence strategy. Yet, the incumbent government will allow
the relatively more eﬃcient TPI to restore peace since the latter’s lower intervention cost creates
scope for a lower intervention price to be paid by the incumbent to the TPI. When the peace-time
proﬁts are very high, however, no third party intervention will be observed, since the incumbent
government will then prefer restoring peace (or suppress the insurgency) with it’s own army, and
therefore will not have to share the proﬁts with the TPI. In that case we would not observe a civilEconomic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 14
war either.
Having derived some clear theoretical predictions on the economic factors favoring third party
intervention, we now confront our ﬁndings to the data.
3 Data
To provide an empirical analysis of the military and economic conditions which are likely to aﬀect
the probability of observing a third party interference in a civil war, according to our theoretical
model, we need to clarify some methodological issues.
We confront the predictions of proposition 2 with the data. Interestingly, proposition 2 speaks
of situations where there is an ongoing conﬂict, due to the government’ decision not to or inability
to deter the opposition. And our main scope is to focus on ongoing civil wars. However, there
are some diﬃculties involved in testing our theories. In our eﬀort to provide realistic proxies
of the "‘observable"’ conditions driving the decision to intervene, we are not always able to
provide nuanced measures, such as the relative strength of the rebel movement or the level of
wages. Moreover, the choice of our control variables is constrained by the need to keep an
acceptable number of observations. Therefore we do not include the level of tax revenue since
this information, available only for a minority of countries and a limited period, would decrease
dramatically the number of observations and would therefore render less credible our statistical
inference.
Our sample of civil wars, disaggregated into periods of third party intervention and non-
intervention, is taken from Balch-Lindsay et al. (2008). These authors split the COW Intra-State
War Participants (Sarkees & Schafer, 2000) into spells to merge the intervention, which is time-
varying, into the civil war data. The sample contains all countries that are in the Correlates of
War system - i.e. all countries with a minimum size and international recognition - and covers
the years 1960-1999. The COW deﬁnition of intervention is consistent with an overt military
contribution of third parties.1
To provide an empirical support to our theoretical hypotheses, we divide the covariates in two
1Speciﬁcally, quotingSmall&Singer(1982, p.219), thirdpartyinvolvementisconsideredaninterventionwhen“direct
military participation of such a magnitude that either 1,000 troops are committed to the combat zone or, if the force is
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groups which identify our variables according to the nature of the conﬂict vis-à-vis the nature of
the economy.
Nature of the conﬂict
To capture the relative ﬁghting eﬀort and the conﬂict technology of the opposition we use
two variables: whether the civil war has separatist goals and the type of terrain. Separatist goals
is a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 when the goal of an opposition group in a civil war
is separatist and 0 otherwise Balch-Lindsay et al. (2008). We use this dummy to proxy for the
importance of the struggle and the relative eﬀorts put in place by the government. Separatist
demands challenge the state sovereignty and the territorial integrity, thus governments should be
more reluctant to surrender than under a non-separatist threat. In fact, throughout the history of
the interstate system, states rarely condoned partition. Moreover, allowing one region to gain
autonomy creates a precedent for subsequent separatist demands. An additional way to capture
the relative rebel strength is the type of terrain. Inhospitable terrains can be used by rebels to
elude government detection; by becoming more inaccessible, rebels can regroup, rearm and train
new recruits. Forested or mountainous regions hamper the detection of the rebels.2 The literature
on civil wars suggest that geography matters and mountainous terrain is signiﬁcantly related to
higherratesofcivilwar(Fearon&Laitin,2003;Collieretal.,2004). Tothisendweusethelogof
the proportion of the country that is "‘mountainous"’ included in Fearon & Laitin (2003) dataset.
We also include some standard control variables widely used in the civil war literature, which may
possibly aﬀect the likelihood of external intervention, such as the degree of ethnic and religious
fractionalization and a dummy that indicates when a state has noncontiguous territory.3 This data
comes from Fearon & Laitin (2003) and should reveal whether ethnic or religious diversity, or a
noncontiguous territory, make an intervention more challenging, and thus more unlikely.
Nature of the economy
The archetypical proﬁtable good in the microeconomic literature is oil. Therefore we take the
level of production of oil (in millions of barrels per day) from Humphreys (2005).4 We include
2For example a variety of rebel groups in Myanmar, managed to survive for long periods by basing themselves in the
rural areas of the state, often avoiding detection by living on steep hills (DeRouen & Heo, 2007).
3Countries with territory holding at least 10,000 people and separated from the land area containing the capital city
either by land or by 100km of water were coded as noncontiguous.
4The oil data is derived from measures reported in the BP Statistical Review of World Energy/BP Statistical Review
of the World Oil Industry (various years), PennWell Corporation’s Oil & Gas Journal, the U.S. Department of Energy, the
OPEC Bulletin, and Petroleum Economist.Economic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 16
the global GDP growth rate as an indicator for the world demand for oil: higher demand for
oil should aﬀect the incentives to military intervene. A country’s per capita GDP is taken as a
proxy for the level of wages. We also add, as a control variable, the value of export of primary
commodities, ranging from agricultural products to crude materials. This aggregate measure is
taken from Fearon (2005) and includes food and live animals (e.g. wheat, coﬀee, sugar), crude
materials (rubber, wood), mineral fuels, lubricants ( e.g. oil, coal, natural gas) and nonferrous
metals (e.g silver, copper, nickel, aluminum, lead). The scope is to show that the presence of
a valuable good - rather than a general measure of trade or export - inﬂuences the likelihood of
external military intervention.
Measuring state strength poses a challenge. We rely on a simple interaction speciﬁcation to test
the idea that a third party intervention in a country with a proﬁtable industry depends on the
degree of stability of this country. To this end, we use the measure of Humphreys (2005), which
is a combination of Fearon & Laitin (2003) political instability - whether a state has undergone
a large change in its political institutions over the past three years, thus indicating weakness of
state structures - and their “anocracy” measure (1 if a state is a robust democracy or a robust
dictatorship and 0 otherwise). This measure allows us to exclude countries where an investment
in the oil sector is highly dangerous and possibly at risk. Approximately 25% of oil-producing
countries in our sample have a low state stability/strenght. All our economic variables reﬂect
pre-civil war levels (i.e. lagged one year prior to the civil war).
4 Econometric model
The main purpose of this analysis is to assess how robust some of the theoretical predictions are
when important econometric issues are taken into account. Therefore we need to clarify our re-
search design. We use the country at war-year as the unit of analysis and examine whether certain
conditions increase the probability of an intervention. The choice of this unit of analysis is due
to the diﬃculty of identifying all relevant dyads, including those that may have considered inter-
vening but chose not to. Using the dyad as the unit of analysis poses the question of which dyads
to use. If we use all possible dyads, then there is an obvious bias toward the non-involvement
decision. If only cases of conﬂicts with interventions are chosen, then there is a strong bias to-Economic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 17
ward the intervention decision, and we would never know which countries ultimately rejected
this option after considering it. A dyadic analysis might be more meaningful if we had a method
to determine the population of potential interveners in each conﬂict. In order to select the coun-
tries which considered but did not enacted an intervention, we should look for an indication of
threats to intervene that were not executed. However, we do not have information on threats to
intervene. The potential for selection bias - either over or under sampling - is acknowledged,
but the counterfactual question of who considered intervening but chose not to is too diﬃcult to
conceptualize theoretically and to disentangle empirically. Although not ideal, focusing on the
conﬂict does allow us to draw useful inferences about the decision process of potential interven-
ers through the evaluation of the hypotheses derived from our theoretical framework. As already
pointed out by Regan (1998), this approach to understanding political outcomes is a well-used
strategy throughout the study of world politics.
Most of the existing empirical literature on the topic suﬀers from an omitted variables bias
which we try to address. The majority of studies use a pooled panel without controlling for unob-
served heterogeneity. This is a serious issue, as the variation between civil wars that experience
third party interventions and those that do not can be driven by factors that are diﬃcult to observe.
A good way to address this concern would be to include country ﬁxed eﬀects. However, we could
not do this as some key explanatory variables such as the percentage of mountainous terrains are
not time-varying.
In our econometric model, a third party decision to intervene is modeled according to the
following reduced form model for participation:
Pr[yit = 1|xit,αi] = Φ(x′
itβ + αi) i = 1,...,N;t = 1,...T (16)
where x is a vector of strictly exogenous observed explanatory variables and β is the associ-
ated coeﬃcient vector. The covariates vector x includes information on the conﬂict, its actors,
and the economy of the country at war. The model also has a random intercept αi to account
for individual-speciﬁc unobserved characteristics. Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a
standard normal variate.
However, the standard uncorrelated random eﬀects model assumes αi to be uncorrelated withEconomic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 18
xit. Following Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain et al. (1984), we allow for a correlation between
αi and the observed characteristics by assuming a relationship of the form αi = x
′
ia + εi and with
εi independent of x′
i. Thus the model may be written as:
Pr[yit = 1|xit,αi] = Φ(x′
itβ + x
′
ia + εi) i = 1,...,N;t = 1,...T (17)
5 Results
In column 1 of Table 1 we report the benchmark model, a random eﬀect probit modeled according
to equation 17, where we include all the relevant variables. This model contains only the multi-
plicative terms (oil and primary commodities weighted by state stability) because we are solely
concerned with the eﬀect of the interaction terms, and we therefore do not include the levels.
Properly interpreted, this interactive term reveals how the eﬀect of exported goods (either highly
proﬁtable or not) on the likelihood of intervention varies with changes in the state stability, or,
alternatively, what is the eﬀect of oil/primary commodities on intervention at any level of state
stability. Therefore, the coeﬃcients in this interactive model describe the relationship between the
variables in diﬀerent terms than do the coeﬃcients in an additive model (i.e. oil + state capacity)
- as conditional relationship rather than general relationship (Friedrich, 1982). The other reason
why we do not include the levels is the strong multicollinearity between levels and interaction.
However, in column 6 we do include both terms to see whether there is any change in the sign
of the coeﬃcients. The results in this last column must be taken with a lot of caution because of
the high correlation among these terms. To check for robustness of the random eﬀect probit, we
run a random eﬀect complementary log log speciﬁcation (column 2), which takes into account
any asymmetry in the distribution of the dependent variable. Finally, to relax the distributional
assumption about the unobserved heterogeneity parameter, we estimate a linear probability model
with ﬁxed eﬀects (column 3). As said above, the covariates which are not time-varying drop out
of the equation. We use a variety of additional checks through the exclusion/inclusion of some
covariates (column 4-6) to assess the robustness of our ﬁndings.
Results in Table 1 conﬁrm most of the arguments derived in the theoretical framework. The
weakness of the opposition forces is a main explanatory factor of external intervention in civilEconomic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 19
wars. The separatist dummy is positive and signiﬁcant as we expected, therefore the opposition’s
separatist claims - and the ensuing government resolve not to relinquish power over its territory -
are more likely to attract external military forces in the dispute. Since partitioning the civil war
state can be assumed to constitute the government’s least preferred outcome, we should expect
a considerable government investment in ﬁghting eﬀort and therefore a relative military supe-
riority. This result is very strong across diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. When civil wars occur
in areas that raise the strength and elusiveness of the opposition forces, such as in regions with
conspicuous mountainous terrains, the probability of intervention decreases. However, this result
is signiﬁcant in only two models, even though it retains the predicted sign. Inquiring into partic-
ular cases suggests that conﬂicts in locations such as Nepal, Pakistan or Chechnya feature very
strong rebel movements (or opposition forces) and long term civil wars, with few eﬀorts to de-
velop a peace process and little external involvement in the aﬀairs of those regions. The standard
variables explaining the onset (and possibly duration) of a civil war, such as the ethno-linguistic
and religious fractionalization and the non-contiguity index, are never statistically signiﬁcant in
explaining the occurrence of external interventions. Our main contribution lies in the identiﬁca-
tion of some economic forces driving the decision to intervene. The interaction term between oil
production and state strength is positive and signiﬁcant over diﬀerent speciﬁcations, and validates
our prior that the proﬁtability of the exporing industry, weighted by the capacity of the state to
enhance the investment “feasibility”, is a strong factor determining the decision to interfere in
a civil war. While this interaction term is always positive, and fails to be signiﬁcant only when
we include the levels (i.e. oil + state strength), as expected due to the high collinearity, the lev-
els alone (column 5) are insigniﬁcant. This supports are theoretical arguments and shows how a
multiplicative-dummy formulation can provide a more detailed description of the relationships in
a set of data and increased explanatory power (see Friedrich, 1982).
To show that this result is neither driven by the choice of the proxy for state capacity nor by
export-based measures - or just by the openness or the level of trade of the country - we control
for the value of primary commodity exports, interacted with the state strength. The coeﬃcients
are close to zero and mostly insigniﬁcant, thus suggesting that the quantity of the valuable good
produced by the country at war is the main economic determinant of intervention. Our model
sheds also light on the role played by the global demand for the proﬁtable industry’s productionEconomic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 20
in the decision to interfere in an ongoing civil conﬂict. As previously mentioned, we use the
global GDP growth rate, which indicates the world’s appetite for energy, notably oil and other
raw materials. The coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant in the random eﬀect probit and comple-
mentary log log, but it fails to attain statistical signiﬁcance in the linear probability model, even
though it has the predicted sign. Finally, our theoretical expectations on the level of wages are
also supported by the empirical ﬁndings. The GDP per capita is negative and signiﬁcant in all
the alternative speciﬁcations: therefore lower wages are associated with higher odds of third party
intervention. Overall, our results do not show relevant exceptions, and the signs of the coeﬃcients
point in the direction predicted by the theoretical arguments.
6 Conclusions
We have built a model of civil conﬂict in which the government and the opposition forces struggle
for the control of the territory and can engage in ﬁghting. We deﬁne two states of the world, with
or without a third party intervening in the dispute, and identify a set of parameters, mostly linked
to the economic proﬁtability of the country at war, which are likely to prompt external military
intervention. The existing literature on third party intervention rarely endogenizes the presence
of a third party actor in a two-party civil war environment and devotes no attention to the eﬀect
of economic factors on the incentives to intervene, such as the presence of natural resources or
the level of state capacity. Since the decision to actively participate in the ﬁght is explained by
a number of economic and strategic conditions that constrain choices and inﬂuence the decision
process, we draw inferences on how these conditions aﬀect the intervention calculus. We include
in the analysis new variables - e.g. on oil production and state strength - that play a crucial
role in our model, but have been largely neglected in the existing literature. We ﬁnd that the
interaction between state strength and the size of a proﬁtable industry (i.e. oil), tends to increase
the incentives for external military involvement. In contrast, the strength of the opposition forces
is found to decrease the scope for involvement.
The rhetoric for intervention, or its stated goal, is usually controversial and has been debated
over the years. The contrasting recent events in Libya, where intervention has occurred, and in
Syria, where, to date, intervention has not been on the agenda, call for a more thorough under-Economic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 21
standing of the conditions under which third party states are willing to dispatch military forces in
an ongoing civil strife. Our theoretical framework and empirical analysis shed light on some of
the economic and strategic conditions predicting the likelihood of intervention. In this sense, we
think that integrating two-party economic models of conﬂict in a simple and tractable way may
serve as a useful guide for how observable strategic, economic and political factors determine the
probability of an external intervention, and possibly the outcome of the conﬂict.Economic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 22
Table 1: Random eﬀect probit, complementary log log and linear probability model with ﬁxed eﬀect for intervention
probability in civil wars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RE Probit† RE clogclog† LPM RE Probit† RE Probit† RE Probit†
Separatist 1.944∗∗∗ 2.442∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 1.973∗∗∗ 2.051∗∗∗ 2.095∗∗∗
(4.08) (4.20) (4.99) (4.05) (3.78) (4.07)
Mountainousness -0.415 -0.557 -1.633∗ -1.291 -1.759∗∗
(-0.81) (-0.86) (-2.14) (-1.92) (-2.59)
Ethno Fraction. -0.982 -1.269 -4.531 -3.486 -4.797
(-0.45) (-0.46) (-1.63) (-1.34) (-1.81)
Religious Fraction. -0.450 -0.276 1.753 2.079 2.346
(-0.16) (-0.08) (0.60) (0.68) (0.71)
Noncontiguous -0.317 -0.348 -0.0846 1.857 1.678 2.755
(-0.20) (-0.16) (-0.29) (1.14) (1.07) (1.49)
Commodity*State Strength -0.310 -0.633 -0.0358
(-0.32) (-0.53) (-0.30)
Oil*State Strength 2.380∗∗ 2.826∗∗ 0.131∗ 1.822∗∗ 5.495
(3.10) (2.98) (2.59) (2.75) (1.82)
World GDP growth rate 0.562∗ 0.652∗ 0.0256 0.484 0.309 0.481
(2.15) (2.32) (0.97) (1.93) (1.19) (1.71)
GDP per capita -22.63∗∗∗ -24.84∗∗∗ -1.785∗∗∗ -17.05∗∗ -10.16∗ -15.06∗∗
(-3.72) (-3.93) (-3.51) (-2.72) (-1.96) (-2.65)
State Strength 0.223 -0.210
(0.59) (-0.49)
Oil Production -0.301 -5.913
(-0.50) (-1.89)
_cons -0.351 -1.224 0.392∗∗∗ 3.844 -7.677∗ -2.129
(-0.15) (-0.44) (4.37) (1.24) (-2.39) (-0.51)
lnσ2
α 1.700∗∗∗ 2.145∗∗∗ 2.556∗∗∗ 2.137∗∗∗ 2.692∗∗∗
(3.40) (4.42) (4.38) (3.68) (5.04)
N 382 382 382 395 395 395
t statistics in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Correlation between εi and the observed characteristics is allowed by assuming a relationship of the form: εi = xa + αi,where αi ∼
iidN(0,σ2
α).Economic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil War 23
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